Financial Services
Resilience you can evidence on the day the supervisor asks.
Your institution runs on software you increasingly do not operate yourself — core banking platforms, multi-cloud architectures, fintech APIs and non-deterministic models. DORA made the operational resilience of all of it your responsibility, and the EU AI Act extends that accountability to the models themselves.
The policies are usually in place, documented and approved. What supervisors test is whether they are enforced in the architecture, and whether you can show it without standing up a project to assemble the evidence each time.
Three recur across banks, insurers and payment institutions — whatever their size.
Critical functions run on providers you contract but do not control. You have to register, test and be able to exit them, with evidence that satisfies a supervisor rather than a procurement file.
Resilience testing is expected to reflect how you would actually fail, including threat-led testing on live systems for significant entities. Running it without disrupting operations is a discipline of its own.
Creditworthiness and insurance pricing models fall under the EU AI Act’s high-risk rules, on top of existing model risk expectations. Validation has to cover data, drift and explainability — not only accuracy at launch.
As a financial entity, you answer to secure development and operational resilience regulation, the supervisory expectations around it, and a new layer of AI rules.
ICT risk management, incident reporting, resilience testing and third-party risk, applicable since January 2025.
Required of designated entities under DORA’s standards on threat-led testing, run in line with the TIBER-EU framework as updated in 2025.
Creditworthiness assessment of individuals and life and health insurance pricing are high-risk uses, with obligations for providers and deployers from December 2027.
Banking and financial market infrastructures are in scope, with DORA applying as the sector-specific act.
EBA, EIOPA and national supervisors set expectations on outsourcing, model risk and ICT governance around DORA.
DORA moved the question from whether you are resilient to whether you can show it — including for the providers you do not control.
A gap assessment against the DORA ICT risk management requirements and the supervisory expectations built on them, with the register of information and the third-party arrangements read together. Where you also report in the US, the same work covers the SOX control environment and the SOC 2 criteria your own customers will ask you to evidence.
- Findings mapped to the article and the control they affect
- Evidence organized the way a supervisor asks for it, not the way your tools store it
Independent testing of what a provider delivered against what you contracted for, run by a party that is neither the provider nor the team that selected them.
- Threat-led penetration testing aligned to TIBER-EU where it applies
- Exit and substitutability tested as scenarios rather than asserted in a clause
Credit, pricing and fraud models assessed as high-risk AI systems: the data behind them, the oversight around them, and the record that has to explain a decision to the person it was made about.
- Documentation and logging that meet the provider or deployer obligations you actually hold
- Human oversight that can intervene in time, tested rather than described
Customer-facing releases that keep their pace without losing the audit trail, with security designed in from the infrastructure layer up to the application and the agentic workflows running on top of it.
Where our work in financial services concentrates.
Designed and engineered enterprise accounting, general ledger and customer loan tracking platforms, with secure database layers, automated auditing and encrypted file transfers.
Published empirical findings on the impact of software security in highly regulated environments, and authored industry-standard DevSecOps maturity models — the basis of our own independent maturity rating.
Keynote speaker and panelist at leading financial and enterprise cybersecurity summits, including RSAC and the DevSecOps Enterprise Summit, on measuring risk and enforcing compliance in rapid delivery pipelines.
Governance, controls, incident classification and reporting, assessed against the regulation rather than against a framework that resembles it.
Testing built on current threat intelligence for your institution, aligned to TIBER-EU where the authority expects it.
Critical providers assessed technically, including what substitution would actually require.
Credit, pricing and fraud models validated against high-risk obligations, including explainability and human oversight.