Industries

The standards differ, the evidence differs, and the people asking for it are not your engineers.

Different Regulators, Same Problem

A hospital, a rail operator and a bank answer to different authorities and share almost nothing operationally. What they share is one structural constraint: the people who decide whether the software is acceptable sit apart from the people who built it, and they will not take the builder’s word for it.

The evidence is part of the deliverable

Working software is not the finish line. The artifacts proving how it was built are examined as closely as the product itself, and increasingly they are expected as evidence as code — produced by the lifecycle rather than written up after it.

The reviewer sits outside

A regulator, a certification body, a supervisor or a paying buyer. They set the terms of acceptance, and none of them reports into your delivery organization.

Failure is not recoverable by release

A post-release patch cannot undo a recall, a grounded fleet, a supervisory finding or a public inquiry.

The obligations outlive the program

Systems certified once are maintained for decades, under rules that keep moving around them.

Built for Complex Environments

Our service model is shaped by the conditions our clients work under. These are the characteristics that make software risk hard to see and expensive to get wrong.

Public Sector

Large programs, vendor-heavy

Multi-vendor programs where the buyer needs its own view of what is being delivered.

Healthcare & MedTech

IEC 62304 & MDR

Software inside regulated medical devices, where evidence is part of the product.

Aerospace & Defense

DO-178C & DO-254

Certification-bound systems with no tolerance for unverified change.

Energy & Critical Infrastructure

NIS2 & CRA

Operational technology and long-lived systems now inside a tightening security regime.

Financial Services

DORA & EU AI Act

Resilience and model governance under supervisors who ask for proof, not intent.

Automotive & Rail

ISO 26262 & EN 50716

Functional safety across software that ships in millions of units or runs for decades.

Where Each Sector Usually Starts

All three service pillars apply in all six sectors. What differs is the entry point — the thing the obligations force first.

Public Sector

USUAL ENTRY POINT

Assessment & Audit — a health check on a program already in flight

OFTEN FOLLOWED BY

Independent V&V — acceptance testing against what vendors deliver

Healthcare & MedTech

USUAL ENTRY POINT

Independent V&V — safety-critical verification of device software

OFTEN FOLLOWED BY

Assessment & Audit — compliance readiness ahead of submission

Aerospace & Defense

USUAL ENTRY POINT

Independent V&V — full-scope IV&V against certification objectives

OFTEN FOLLOWED BY

Advisory & Consulting — certification support and design authority

Energy & Critical Infrastructure

USUAL ENTRY POINT

Assessment & Audit — DORA and EU AI Act readiness at supervisory depth

OFTEN FOLLOWED BY

Independent V&V — AI system validation and vendor acceptance

Automotive & Rail

USUAL ENTRY POINT

Independent V&V — functional safety verification

OFTEN FOLLOWED BY

Assessment & Audit — supply chain audit across tiers

Two Capabilities That Cut Across All Six

Some work does not belong to a single sector. Two areas are demanded in several of the six at once, and we run both from one team.

Safety & Mission Critical V&V

Required in four of the six sectors above, under four different standards, on one underlying discipline.

AI Assurance & Validation

The newest obligation across all six, and the one with the least precedent to fall back on.

Start with the obligation

that is closest.

Tell us which authority, which standard and which deadline.
We will tell you what evidence it takes.

Not one of the six? The conditions above matter more than the sector label.